Lo stalking quale forma di violenza (domestica) contro le donne: due ipotesi di genere? by van der Aa, Suzan
174© Pensa MultiMedia Editore - ISSN 1121-1717 (print) - ISSN 2240-8053 (on line) Articoli
Keywords: stalking • domestic violence • violence against women • gender • protection orders
Abstract
Stalking is often interpreted within the framework of violence against women or domestic violence. Contrary to research
on domestic violence, the gender-specificity or the domestic violence context of stalking has received only little attention.
Overwhelming empirical evidence suggests that stalking ‘disproportionally affects women’ in the sense that women run a
higher risk of falling victim to stalking. Some studies also attribute more severe consequences to female victimization of
stalking. There is furthermore evidence that a former (violent) relationship increases the risk of stalking victimization and
that a prior romantic involvement has an influence on the seriousness and duration of the stalking. As a result, stalking can
be considered a form of (domestic) violence against women.
Although the violence against women and the domestic violence paradigms were once very useful in generating attention
for the problem of stalking, and although empirical evidence suggests that these perspectives remain useful to date, the fact
that stalking is a heterogeneous phenomenon, affecting male and female, intimate and non-intimate victims, should always
be kept in mind. Legislation which explicitly (e.g., by reserving protection orders to victims of ex-intimate stalking) or in-
advertently (e.g., by using a fear-requirement or by including gender-specific stalking tactics) excludes certain offenders or
victims, as is the case in some EU Member States and the CoE Convention on Combating Violence against Women and
Domestic Violence, should be avoided. 
Parole chiave: stalking • violenza domestica • violenza contro le donne • genere • ordini di protezione 
Riassunto
Nonostante lo stalking venga spesso interpretato come un aspetto della violenza domestica o contro le donne, la sua specificità
di genere o il suo legame con le precedenti forme di violenza non sono stati adeguatamente approfonditi.
Da un punto di vista empirico è ovvio che gli atti persecutori “colpiscono in maniera sproporzionata le donne”, nel senso
che i soggetti di sesso femminile sono maggiormente a rischio di divenire vittime, così come secondo alcuni studi subirebbero
conseguenze più importanti. La vittimizzazione delle stesse sarebbe inoltre influenzata dalla presenza di una precedente (vio-
lenta) relazione, mentre la gravità e la durata della campagna persecutoria dipenderebbero dall’esistenza di un precedente le-
game romantico tra autore e vittima. Sulla base, quindi, delle precedenti osservazioni, lo stalking può essere considerato una
forma di violenza (domestica) contro le donne.
Anche se i paradigmi della violenza domestica hanno contribuito in maniera efficace all’aumento dell’attenzione verso i fe-
nomeni persecutori, tuttavia è importante non dimenticare che lo stalking è un fenomeno eterogeneo, che coinvolge sia
maschi che femmine, (ex)partner e non. Una normativa che esplicitamente (ad esempio, riservando gli ordini di protezione
alle vittime di uno stalker ex-partner) o involontariamente (per esempio, utilizzando il requisito della paura o includendo le
tattiche di stalking legate al genere) esclude alcuni autori o vittime, come avviene in alcuni gli Stati membri dell’UE e - se-
condo il concetto di ‘valutazione di genere’ – nel caso della Convenzione del Consiglio d’Europa per combattere la violenza
contro le donne e la violenza domestica, andrebbe evitata.
Per corrispondenza: SUZAN VAN DER AA PH.D, Assistant professor at the International Victimology Institute Tilburg (INTERVICT), Ad-
dress: Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5000 LE, Tilburg, the Netherlands Telephone number: 0031-13-4663504 e-mail • S.vdrAa@til-
burguniversity.edu 
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1. Introduction
Stalking or the ‘persistent harassment in which one person
repeatedly imposes on another unwanted communications
and/or contacts’ (Mullen, Pathé & Purcell, 2001) is a per-
vasive problem. Prevalence estimates range from 4.5% to
23.4% of the population being affected (Van der Aa, 2010,
p. 52-55) and its impact on victims’ psychological, social
and occupational functioning can be devastating (e.g.,
Budd & Mattinson, 2000; Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998; Pathé
& Mullen, 1997; Kamphuis & Emmelkamp, 2001; Blaauw,
Winkel, Arensman, Sheridan & Roberts, 2002; Dressing,
Keuhner & Gass, 2007; Purcell, Pathé & Mullen, 2004).
In recent years, stalking is often placed within the realm
of violence against women (White, Kowalski, Lyndon &
Valentine, 2001) or domestic violence (Baldry, 2002). A re-
cent European study into violence against women, for in-
stance, mentions stalking in the same breath as female
genital mutilation, domestic violence, forced marriages,
rape and sexual intimidation (EU Commission, 2010). Na-
tional and international legislation perceive stalking from
a certain gender or domestic violence perspective as well.
In the new Council of Europe Convention on preventing
and combating violence against women and domestic vi-
olence, stalking is explicitly included as a form of violence
against women that should be criminalized (article 34). 
Whether this is a good development is debatable. In
comparison, for decennia there has been a bitter fight over
the question if domestic violence constitutes a form of vi-
olence against women or not (Nixon, 2007; Anderson,
2005; Dobash, Dobash, Wilson & Daly, 1992; Dutton &
Nicholls, 2005). Researchers who found symmetric preva-
lence numbers – women and men are approximately just
as often victim and offender of domestic violence – profess
a gender neutral interpretation of domestic violence,
whereas other (feminist) researchers hold on firmly to the
gender specific conceptualization of the problem. This issue
is important, not only because a proper analysis of the
problem could contribute to its solution, but also because
the distribution of government funds could be linked to
the outcome of the debate, such as financial support of
shelters for male victims. 
In order to answer these questions, an overview of the dif-
ferent ways in which stalking has been perceived over the years
will be presented first (§ 2). Although stalking was initially con-
nected to domestic violence perpetrated by a male offender
against a female victim, the stalking paradigm has slowly shifted
towards a more heterogeneous understanding of the phenom-
enon, including victims and offenders from both genders and
non-intimate stalking. In the next two paragraphs the results
of several empirical studies into stalking as a form of violence
against women (§ 3) and domestic violence (§ 4) are presented.
In § 5 some of the national and international legal measures
against stalking are described, with a specific focus on the gen-
der-and domestic violence perspective in legislation, and their
implementation in practice. In this respect, not only the spe-
cific anti-stalking provisions will be discussed, but more
generic protection measures with relevance for stalking vic-
tims, such as protection orders, will be taken into account as
well. Subsequently, the advantages and disadvantages of a gen-
der specific and domestic violence approach in research and
legislation are discussed (§ 6) after which the article will finish
with a conclusion (§ 7).
2. Different interpretations of stalking 
Stalking is a new word for behaviour that is as old as
mankind (Mullen, Pathé & Purcell, 2001; Finch, 2001, p. 27;
Meloy, 1998, p. 4). However, it was onlyin the 1980s’ after
the media started denominating the serial killer Son of Sam
and the paparazzi tailing Jacky Kennedy with the word
‘stalking’ that it was linked to the phenomenon of unwanted
pursuit and harassment. The word soon caught on and be-
came the common term to describe the behaviour of serial
killers, rapists, and celebrity murderers (Kamir, 2001, p. 148).  
Over the years, the interpretation of the word stalking
has changed. Lowney & Best (1995) analysed press releases
that were published or broadcasted in the period from 1980
until 1994 and they discovered that the meaning of the con-
cept had undergone some transformations. In the period
from 1980 and 1988 the term was, for instance, used to de-
scribe sexual intimidation, obsessive pursuit and psycholog-
ical violence committed by a man against his female
(ex)partner. Despite the efforts of the women’s movement,
this form of stalking received little media attention. 
This changed in the period between 1989 and 1991
when, in the wake of the murder of the famous American
actress Rebecca Shaeffer by her former stalker, the term be-
came associated with the relentless pursuit of celebrities by
obsessed fans (celebrity stalking). Shaeffer’s murder gener-
ated much publicity and from that moment onwards, stalk-
ing was predominantly seen as an issue that celebrities had
to cope with.
Heavily influenced by the domestic violence lobby, the
stalking rhetoric in the media returned again to the situa-
tion in which women were harassed by their male ex-part-
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1 Similar definitions can be found in CEDAW Committee
General Recommendation No. 19 on violence against
women (1992), the United Nations General Assembly Dec-
laration on the Elimination of Violence against Women
(1993), and Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of the Commit-
tee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member states
on the protection of women against violence (2002). 
2 There are also definitions which distinguish sex specific violence
from gender specific violence, in which sex refers to the bio-
ners in 1992. Stalking was redefined as a widespread form
of domestic violence and this time, stalking did receive the
attention it deserved. The media portrayals of stalking vic-
tims caused considerable commotion and together with
other social developments – such as the increased sensitivity
for violations of privacy and the changed role of women
in society – they brought about recognition for stalking as
a serious social problem (Mullen, Pathé & Purcell, 2009).
In 1990 it even led to the enactment of the first anti-stalk-
ing law in California. From that moment on, the increased
attention for stalking persisted, even when the concept was
broadened to include behaviour committed by others than
the male ex-partner. 
Nowadays, stalking is studied in all its forms, regardless
of the (former) relationship between the offender and the
victim, but there are numerous researchers who continue
interpreting stalking as a form of violence against women
and/or domestic violence (Coleman, 1997; Baldry, 2002;
Burgess et al., 1997). Many national and international leg-
islators are attracted to this paradigm as well (see paragraph
5). Furthermore, the stereotype stalking scenario – that of a
man harassing his female ex-partner – has firmly set in the
minds of numerous people. The next two paragraphs exam-
ine the empirical support for the legitimacy of a gender spe-
cific or domestic violence perspective to the problem. 
3. Stalking as a form of violence against women?
Whether stalking can be considered a gender specific prob-
lem depends on the definition of ‘violence against women’.
Following the example set by the Council of Europe Con-
vention and several other international documents, the cur-
rent article defines ‘violence against women’ as: 
(...) a violation of human rights and a form of discrimi-
nation against women and shall mean all acts of gender-
based violence that result in or are likely to result in,
physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suf-
fering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in
public or in private life (Art. 3(a) Council of Europe Con-
vention on combating and preventing violence against
women and domestic violence)1.
‘Gender-based violence’ is defined as ‘violence that is
directed against a woman because she is a woman or that
affects women disproportionately’ (Art. 3(d) Council of Eu-
rope Convention on combating and preventing violence
against women and domestic violence)2. 
In other words, the designation ‘gender specific vio-
lence’ can be justified by the underlying motive – violence
against a woman, because she is a woman3 – but also the
fact that a certain type of violence affects women dispro-
portionately often or hard can be sufficient to qualify that
type of violence as a form of violence against women. Since
research into the underlying motive or the deeply rooted
social and cultural notions on gender and inequality of
power as the underlying cause of stalking has not been car-
ried out yet, the question of whether stalking is a form of
violence against women can only be assessed by looking at
the prevalence of the problem amongst both men and
women.
In Table I the results of several large scale prevalence
studies on stalking are presented, with the restriction that
only studies that (also) differentiate between male and fe-
male victims have been included. Although the studies pres-
ent large disparities when it comes to exact percentages,
they all show that women fall victim to stalking more often
than men. 
If we now take the definition of violence against
women and place it against the results depicted in table 1,
it is fair to conclude that the conceptualisation of stalking
as a form of violence against women is probably appropri-
ate. Women run a far bigger risk of becoming a victim of
stalking than men. Whether that risk is disproportionately
bigger is a matter of interpretation, but in most studies the
percentages of male and female victims deviate to such an
extent, that it is fair to say that the difference is dispropor-
tionate and, consequently, that stalking is a form of violence
against women. 
Some authors have recently begun to challenge the
gender-asymmetry found in stalking prevalence research,
claiming that these studies may underestimate male victim-
ization, because men may be less likely than women to self-
identify as victims of stalking (Langhinrichsen-Rohling,
2012). The main cause for the underestimation of male vic-
timization would be the fact that men report lower levels
of fear in response to stalking experiences, a required defi-
nitional component of many surveys. This does not, haw-
ever, take into account that even general population studies
without fear requirement (Van der Aa & Kunst, 2009) find
women at far greater odds of becoming a victim of stalk-
ing.
logical differences between men and women and gender to the
ideas and prejudices on manliness and femininity and the sex
stereotyping that comes along with those ideas (e.g., Schreijen-
berg, De Vaan, Vanoni & Homburg, 2010, p. 6). Violence that af-
fects women disproportionately would fall under the category
‘sex specific violence’, whereas violence against a woman, be-
cause she is a woman, would categorise as ‘gender specific vio-
lence’. The definition chosen in this article does not differentiate
between sex specific and gender specific violence. 
3 See Committee of Ministers, Explanatory report to the
Council of Europe Convention on combating and preven-
ting violence against women and domestic violence (CM
(2011) 49 final) of 7 April 2011. According to the explanatory
report, this type of violence is both the cause and the conse-
quence of the inequality of power between men and women
in society.  
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4 Keuner et al. (2006) on the other hand, found that the con-
nection between stalking and poor mental health, psychoso-
cial functioning and medicine abuse was equally strong for
both men and women. 
5 However, there are also studies that report a much smaller
proportion of ex-partner of ex-intimate stalking (e.g., Van der
Aa & Pemberton, 2009). 
 
 
                
                 
                   
             
                 
               
                
           
 
Table I 
Large scale (> 400 respondents) studies into the prevalence of stalking within the general population by gender 
Lifetime prevalence by 
gender % Author(s) 
(year) Country Sample size Lifetime prevalence % 
Female Male 
Van der Aa & 
Kunst (2009) 
The Netherlands 1,027 16.5% 20.7% 13.4% 
Van der Aa & 
Pemberton 
(2009) 
The Netherlands 
88,607 24% 28.6% 19.2% 
Aucoin (2005) Canada 24,000 9% 11% 7% 
Basile et al. 
(2006) 
United States 9,684 4.5% 7% 2% 
Budd & 
Mattinson 
(2000) 
England & 
Wales 9,988 11.8% 16.1% 6.8% 
Coleman et al. 
(2007) 
England & 
Wales 26,214 - 23% 13% 
Dressing et al. 
(2005) 
Germany 679 11.6% 17% 4% 
Finney (2006) England & 
Wales 24,498 - 23.3% 15.2% 
Morris et al. 
(2002) 
Scotland 1,024 - 17% 7% 
Purcell et al. 
(2002) 
Australia 1,844 23.4% 32.4% 12.8% 
Stieger et al. 
(2008) 
Austria 401 11% 17% 3% 
Tjaden & 
Thoennes 
(1998) 
United States 
16,000 - 8.1% 2.2% 
Walby & Allen 
(2004) 
England & 
Wales 22,463 - 18.9% 11.6% 
 
                    
                  
                 
                 
And there is, yet another reason to focus on female vic-
tims of stalking. Although existing literature is divided, the
gender of the victim is often associated with the seriousness
of the consequences of the stalking as well. Sheridan & Lyn-
don (2011), for instance, found that stalking had a larger
impact on the mental and physical well-being of women
than men4. From that point of view, one could also argue
that women are ‘disproportionally affected’ by stalking, but
then the disproportionality refers to the health and other
negative consequences of stalking instead of the numerical
preponderance of stalking victimization amongst the female
population. 
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that all
studies invariably report high percentages of male victimiza-
tion as well. Even if we depart from the most conservative es-
timation of 2% (Basile, Swahn, Chen & Saltzman, 2006), this
would still mean that a large part of the male population has
(had) to deal with unwanted, repetitive and possibly frighten-
ing behavior. Men are not immune to the sometimes very
negative consequences of stalking either. Some of them have
suffered from psychosomatic complaints, fear and depression
as a result of the systematic violations of their privacy, just like
their female counterparts.
4. Stalking as a form of domestic violence?
Where the aforementioned studies focused on the gender
dimension of stalking, other studies have emphasized the re-
lationship between stalking and domestic violence instead
(Coleman, 1997; Baldry, 2002; Burgess et al., 1997). Many
men would use stalking as a technique to intimidate and
control their (ex)partners and force them to continue or
renew the intimate relationship. Indeed there have been stud-
ies that found a relationship between (violent) intimate re-
lationships and stalking. Tjaden & Thoennes (2000), for
instance, discovered that 16.5% of the 1,785 police files on
domestic violence contained stalking like behaviour. In Bur-
gess’ (1997) sample of domestic violence offenders one in
every three admitted to have stalked the partner during the
relationship. Also, in a large-scale study amongst 16,000 Ame-
ricans, 60% of the female and 30% of the male stalking vic-
tims had been stalked by the current or former partner
(Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998). Finally, 29% of the women who
had escaped a violent relationship reported that they had
been stalked by their former partners in the previous month
(Mechanic et al., 2000). All in all, stalking by ex-partners
seems to be a pervasive problem5.
Not only does a former (violent) relationship increase
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6 These member states are: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, the Ne-
therlands, Ireland, Hungary, Poland and the UK. In Finland
discussions on the criminalization of stalking are reaching the
final stage. 
the risk of stalking victimization, a prior romantic involve-
ment also has an influence on the seriousness and duration
of the stalking. In general, ex-partner stalkers are more vio-
lent and more persistent than other stalkers (Tjaden & Tho-
ennes, 1998; Pathé & Mullen, 1997; Björklund, Hakkanen-
Nyholm, Sheridan & Roberts, 2010). 
Although there seems to be a significant correlation bet-
ween stalking and a former (violent) relationship this is far
from a one-on-one correspondence. The spectrum of both
victims and offenders is much wider: not all violent partners
use stalking techniques during the relationship, not all inti-
mate stalkers were violent before the break-up, and there are
ample examples of stalking cases in which there was no prior
romantic involvement between the stalker and the victim at
all (Van der Aa, 2010). 
5. Stalking as a form of domestic violence against
women in legislation and practice
5.1. National legislation and practice on stalking
How does this translate into the anti-stalking legislation of
the different European member states and the implemen-
tation of this legislation in practice? When comparing Eu-
ropean member states, a first difference that attracts the
attention is the fact that many of them have not enacted
specific anti-stalking legislation at all. Only thirteen out of
the twenty-seven member states have explicitly criminali-
zed stalking6. The other member states rely on general pro-
visions, such as assault, vandalism, and defamation or slander,
or they do not consider the behavior to be a social problem
(see European Commission, 2010). This is different from
the United States where all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have enacted anti-stalking legislation (Purcell,
Pathé & Mullen, 2004). 
If we look to the European countries that have crimina-
lized stalking, we see that none of them have opted for a gen-
der specific legal definition (see legal definitions in
Appendix). All criminal provisions are gender neutral and do
not explicitly distinguish between a male or a female victim,
at least not at first glance. However, stalking definitions may
be designed in a manner that unintentionally, systematically
includes male perpetration or excludes male victimization.
The incorporation or exclusion of certain behaviors in stal-
king definitions may change the degree to which women
and men meet the criteria for stalking perpetration, because
certain stalking activities may be gender-specific (Davis,
Swan & Gambone, 2010; Thompson, Dennison & Stewart,
2010). If, for instance, mild to moderate physical violence is
included in stalking provisions, this may increase the odds of
identifying women as stalking perpetrators (Thompson,
Dennison & Stewart, 2010), just as gossiping (Davis, Swan &
Gambone, 2010) or scraping keys across an ex-partner’s car
(Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 2012). Behavior that has been
identified as typically male is, for instance, repeatedly sending
unwanted gifts after being rejected (Yanowitz & Yanowitz,
2010). Closer inspection of the stalking definitions reveals
that many of them have indeed included a (limitative) list of
stalking tactics, such as seeking physical proximity, using
means of telecommunication, soliciting by proxy stalking, or
threatening the victim (e.g., Austria, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Germany). Other definitions have included the requi-
rement that the suspect must have had mens rea to cause fear
in the victim (e.g., Italy). This may decrease the degree to
which stalking is recognized as a crime committed by
women, since research indicates that female offenders are less
likely to perceive their behavior as fear-inducing, even when
they employ the same stalking techniques as male stalkers
(Thompson, Dennison & Stewart, 2010). Unfortunately, the
current state-of-the-art in stalking research does not allow
for decisive conclusions on which tactics are primarily em-
ployed by male or female stalkers and, consequently, which
legal definitions inadvertently direct the attention towards
male or female perpetrators, but chances are that some stal-
king definitions are implicitly gender-specific when it comes
to perpetration.
A similar line of reasoning goes for stalking victimization.
Irrespective of the actual dangerousness of a given situation,
male victims of stalking experience less fear than female
stalking victims, with women reporting greater overall fear
levels compared to men (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000; Sheri-
dan & Lyndon, 2010). This means that fear can be conside-
red a gender-based construct. This raises concerns about in
certain EU Member States that requires victims to have ex-
perienced fear as a result of the stalking (e.g., Czech Re-
public). Given that levels of fear are gender-influenced,
more women than men will meet this criterion. 
As for stalking and domestic violence: most criminal
provisions leave the explicit link with domestic violence
out of the equation as well. This means that stalking outside
the domestic context is also criminalized; at least the legal
definition is not restricted to the domestic (violence) con-
text. The only three legal definitions that do distinguish bet-
ween stalking inside and outside the domestic circle are the
German, the Italian, and the Hungarian. In Germany, stal-
king is usually prosecuted after a complaint of the victim,
but the public prosecutor can prosecute ex-intimate stalkers
ex officio. This exception was deemed necessary, because one
cannot expect the victim to ask for the prosecution of the
ex-partner. Still, this distinction is only trivial: in Germany
all stalking is criminalized regardless of the prior relationship
between victim and offender, only the formal requirements
of prosecution differ. The Hungarian and Italian stalking le-
gislators made (ex)intimate stalking an aggravated offence.
However, although the anti-stalking legislation in the
European member states is in principle neutral, supplemen-
tary policy or the implementation of the law in practice
can bear more explicit reference to a gender specific ap-
proach or an approach focused on ex-intimate stalking. In
the Netherlands, for instance, the stalking legislation is ap-
plicable to all victims regardless of their gender or the prior
relationship with their stalker. However, when guidelines
for the police and the public prosecution service are taken
into account, the policy towards stalking may not be as neu-
tral as it appears at first sight. According to the domestic
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violence and honor based violence instruction (Aanwijzing
huiselijk geweld en eergerelateerd geweld)7:
Domestic violence is violence perpetrated by someone
from within the domestic circle of the victim. This inclu-
des physical and sexual violence, stalking and intimidation
(whether or not perpetrated by means of, or involving the
damaging of goods in and around the house). Suspects of
domestic violence can be: (ex)partners, family members
and family friends. Suspects can be male and female, chil-
dren or adults (including the elderly) [translation and em-
phasis – SvdA]. 
This excerpt shows that in the Netherlands, domestic
violence can consist of stalking. In itself, this does not mean
that stalking is exclusively linked to domestic violence, but
it is remarkable that this is the only time the word ‘stalking’
appears in a policy guideline of the public prosecution ser-
vice. There is no separate guideline for stalking outside the
domestic circle of the victim, such as stalking by strangers
or acquaintances other than family friends. 
The enforcement of anti-stalking legislation in practice
bears even stronger witness to the link between stalking, do-
mestic violence and gender. From interviews with Dutch
police officers and public prosecutors it appears that stalking
is generally seen as a form of domestic violence and that it
is mostly police officers and prosecutors who specialize in
domestic violence who are assigned to take on stalking cases
(Van der Aa, 2010, p. 157). Furthermore, instead of providing
for a separate course or training for law enforcement per-
sonnel, stalking is usually dealt with during general courses
on domestic violence (Van der Aa, 2010, pp. 165-166). The
inadvertent consequence might be that less experienced law
enforcement officers overlook stalking committed outside
the domestic circle. In fact, even the interviewed police of-
ficers and prosecutors – all experts in the field of stalking –
harbored certain prejudices. Some of them, for instance, au-
tomatically qualified stalking outside the domestic circle as
‘less serious’ and they preferred victims of other types of stal-
king to look for alternative solutions first before going to
the police (Van der Aa, 2010, p. 176). 
Similar prejudices were found in comparing male and fe-
male victimization scripts. Male victims of stalking were ge-
nerally perceived as being more capable to solve the stalking
problem themselves, to experience less fear, and to be (co-)
responsible for their own victimization (Wigman, 2009). If
these preconceptions continue to reverberate throughout the
legal system – also impacting police responses and trial ver-
dicts – identical types of stalking will be judged differently
when perpetrated or experienced by a man or a woman
(Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 2012). In other words, even
though the law in the books does not depart from a certain
gender or domestic violence bias, the law in practice may.
5.2. National legislation on protection orders
Where the gender and domestic violence dimension is
only expressed indirectly in anti-stalking legislation and
regulation – mainly in policy guidelines, practice and le-
gislative components that may inadvertently be gender-
biased – it becomes much more explicit once the
legislation on protection orders is taken into account. For
criminalizing stalking is not enough: victims should also
have access to other types of protection to prevent repea-
ted victimization. Victims of crimes that are characterized
by multiple incidents, such as stalking and domestic vio-
lence, have an additional need for protection compared to
victims of single-incident crimes. For that reason, protec-
tion orders have significantly gained in popularity ever
since the 1970s, first as a civil law measure in divorce pro-
ceedings, but later on also as an action independent from
divorce proceedings and as a criminal law measure. As soon
as the order is imposed, the offender is no longer allowed
to contact the victim or to be in the victim’s vicinity for
a dedicated period of time. 
A first inventory of protection order legislation in the
European member states showed that many countries ex-
clusively reserve this type of legislation for (female) victims
of domestic violence (Van der Aa, 2011). In Bulgaria, Italy,
Hungary and Slovenia, for instance, the civil protection or-
ders are only available to victims of domestic violence. In
Malta, France and Lithuania even stricter criteria apply: civil
protection orders can only be imposed in cases of domestic
violence if the applicant has simultaneously initiated a di-
vorce proceeding. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece,
Hungary and possibly also Spain provide criminal protection
orders only to victims of domestic violence. 
Although these results need to be interpreted with cau-
tion8, it seems as if some member states only allow access
to civil and/or criminal protection orders to victims of do-
mestic violence, not to others. This means that victims who
are stalked by someone other than their ex-partners cannot
benefit from these protection measures9. Victims who are
stalked by acquaintances, strangers or sometimes even
(ex)partners whom they have not entered into matrimony
with are denied this form of protection. And again, even if
de jure the measure is not linked to the (prior) relationship
between stalker and victim, de facto it might be imposed in
situations of ex-intimate stalking only (Van der Aa, 2011). 
5.3. The Convention on combating and preventing violence against
women and domestic violence
On an international level the interpretation of stalking as a
form of violence against women is even more evident. An
example is the resolution of the European Parliament on
violence against women10 and the Council of Europe Con-
7 Aanwijzing huiselijk geweld en eergerelateerd geweld, Staats-
courant 2010, 6462.
8 The sources that formed the basis of the article were some-
times difficult to interpret and often contradicted one another
(see Van der Aa, 2011 for the limitations of the study). 
9 In some of these countries criminal protection orders are pro-
bably unattainable for all stalking victims, given that stalking
is not even criminalized to begin with.  
10 On 5 April 2011 the European Parliament adopted a non-
binding resolution on a new EU policy plan to fight violence
against women (European Parliament Resolution of 5 April
2011 on priorities and outline of a new EU policy frame-
work to fight violence against women (2010/2209/INI). Ac-
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cording to the Members of Parliament stalking ‘should be
considered as a form of violence against women and be sub-
ject to a legal framework in all Member States.’
11 See consideration 45 of the Explanatory report (Committee
of Ministers, Explanatory report to the Council of Europe
Convention on combating and preventing violence against
women and domestic violence (CM (2011) 49 final) of 7
April 2011). 
12 See consideration 37 of the Explanatory report. 13 See consideration 153 of the Explanatory report. 
vention on combating violence against women and dome-
stic violence [hereafter: the Convention] that was opened
up for signature on 11 May 2011. When the Convention is
enacted, it will be the first legally binding international in-
strument on the European continent on violence against
women and domestic violence. The Convention has a clear
gender dimension: violence against women and domestic
violence are seen as forms of discrimination and gender
specific violence, although it is acknowledged that men can
fall victim to domestic violence as well, albeit to a much
lesser extent than women (see preamble).
The Convention prescribes the criminalization of stal-
king. Article 34 reads as follows:
Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measu-
res to ensure that the intentional conduct of repeatedly
engaging in threatening conduct directed at another per-
son, causing her or him to fear for her or his safety, is cri-
minalised.
At first sight, this provision seems neutral: both male and
female victims; and both ex-intimate and non-intimate vic-
tims are protected. But again, the fear-requirement may
have an impact on men’s ability to recognize themselves as
stalking victims and on their chances to have their case suc-
cessfully followed through the criminal law system. Also the
fact that stalking perpetrated by men is generally perceived
as more threatening than identical activities employed by
women can have a bearing on the gendered interpretation
of this stalking definition. After all, Article 34 requires the
engagement in ‘threatening’ conduct. Furthermore, al-
though Article 34 itself does not explicitly distinguish bet-
ween gender or a domestic violence context it has to be
read in conjunction with the other provisions and the ex-
planatory report. Then the gender-neutral interpretation of
Article 34 becomes less straightforward.
It seems, for instance, that the Convention only expli-
citly acknowledges male victims in cases of domestic violence,
not other forms of violence covered by the Convention11.
Also, the signatory states are only encouraged to combat (do-
mestic) violence against men12. It is up to the states to de-
cide whether the applicability of the Convention is
extended to male victims as well, as long as female victims
are protected. This suggests that the focus should remain on
combating violence against women at all times. Indeed, the
Convention even imperatively prescribes that states include
a ‘gender perspective in the implementation and evaluation’
of the provisions of the Convention (article 6). Finally, even
though the drafters of the Convention stipulate that all cri-
minal law provisions of the Convention should in principle
be presented in a gender-neutral manner, signatory states
are free to introduce gender-specific provisions13. Although
the Convention itself seems to lean towards a criminaliza-
tion of stalking that is (at least outwardly) gender-neutral,
these ‘mixed messages’ could give rise to interpretative issues
as to whether male victims should fall under the definition
of stalking or not. 
The gendered focus is even more apparent when it
comes to protective, supportive and preventive measures. All pro-
tection and support measures enumerated in chapter 4 of the
Convention, for instance, need to be based on a ‘gendered
understanding’ of violence against women and domestic vio-
lence (Article 18(3)). This gendered understanding is, for
example, manifested in the fact that parties need to provide
for sufficient numbers of shelters, ‘especially for women and their
children’ (Article 23 and consideration 133 Explanatory re-
port). Furthermore, all professionals in contact with victims
need to receive gender sensitive training (considerations 98
and 99 Explanatory report).
It is not clear how the words ‘gendered understanding’
and ‘gender sensitive’ have to be interpreted. If it means that
protection of women victims should be prioritized at the
expense of male victims who experience similar types of stalking
behavior, e.g., because public funding does not allow for all
victims to be protected and supported, the Convention
would strike the wrong cord. In my opinion, a ‘hierarchy
of suffering’ based on gender alone is unwarranted in the
criminal, civil or administrative justice context and it would
attest to a form of improper discrimination itself. Given
equal stalking severity, the gender of the victim should not
influence the course of a criminal procedure or the access
to protection orders. If, on the other hand, gender-sensitive
means that the needs of male and female victims may vary
and that the justice system should take this into account to
the greatest extent possible without depriving other (male)
victims of their right to protection, then a gender-sensitive
interpretation of stalking is no longer objectionable. Female
victims may, for instance, have an additional need for pro-
tection of their children. Also they may need extra help in
finding paid employment or other ways of securing finan-
cial independence.  
6. Advantages and disadvantages of a gender or
domestic violence perspective
How should the various perspectives on stalking be appre-
ciated? From the stalking victims’ point of view, which ad-
vantages and disadvantages are connected to a gendered or
a domestic violence interpretative framework?
An apparent advantage of placing stalking within the
framework of (domestic) violence against women is the fact
that in the 1980s and 1990s it generated much attention for
the phenomenon. Thanks to the link with (domestic) violence
against women the relatively unknown problem of stalking
became familiar to a large number of people. It was no longer
uniquely associated with celebrities and society at large came
to recognize stalking as a problem which could affect ordinary
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men and women as well. Nowadays the linkage of stalking
with domestic violence and violence against women remains
useful in that respect, because both topics are at the centre of
(legislative) attention. Not only is more and more legislation
produced in both areas, but stalking also profits from the very
active and well organized violence against women lobby
which continues placing stalking on the political agenda. 
There is also a very pragmatic argument in favour of po-
sitioning stalking within the (domestic) violence against
women context. Fact is that women run a much higher risk
of becoming victim of stalking, so law enforcement agents and
aid workers had better reckon with this widespread scenario.
It is therefore sensible to reserve most of the available facilities
for female victims instead of men. It also appears that ex-part-
ner stalking generally proceeds in a more serious and pro-
tracted manner than other types of stalking. If one takes this
into account – e.g., in making a risk assessment which allows
victims of ex-partner stalking to qualify for protection meas-
ures sooner – this only indicates sound judgment. 
Likewise there are very few objections to studying stalking
within the (domestic) violence against women context from a
scientific point of view. Although stalking should be studied in
all its manifestations, it remains relevant to investigate how the
connections between domestic violence, gender and stalking
can be interpreted and to validate previous findings. Are, for
instance, ex-intimate stalkers indeed more prone to use physical
violence or not? Does stalking indeed have a bigger impact on
women or do other factors play a role? And which stalking tac-
tics are typically male or female? Based on the outcome of
these studies a reliable stalking typology or risk assessment in-
strument could be developed, which in turn could contribute
to the design of (more) effective anti-stalking measures. 
But there is a possible downside. The same explicit link-
age of stalking to (domestic) violence against women can
turn out wrong for stalking victims. Precisely because of its
strong gendered focus and its reference to gender discrim-
ination the Council of Europe Convention may run the
risk of putting off certain signatory states14. States which
prefer a gender (discrimination) neutral approach to crimes
and criminalization may hesitate to sign the Convention,
let alone ratify it. So far only twenty states have signed the
Convention and there has been only one ratification
(Turkey)15. The in itself gender neutral recommendation to
criminalize stalking might get lost because of this. 
The most important problem of a gender specific or do-
mestic violence perspective, however, is that it may put cer-
tain stalking victims at a disadvantage. If legislation or
regulation is only applicable to female victims or victims of
ex-partner stalking, the disadvantage is obvious, but also with
(outwardly) neutral legislation there is a risk that certain vic-
tims remain unnoticed or are confronted with disbelief and
ridicule by law enforcement agents. Because of unfamiliarity
with the different manifestations of stalking, the inadvertent
gender specificity of certain legal definitions of stalking, and
because of taboos surrounding certain forms of stalking –
think of stalking of a male victim by a female offender – even
the victims themselves may fail to recognize their own vic-
timization and may refrain from reporting their experiences
to the police (Englebrecht & Reyns, 2011). Male victims, for
instance, are generally seen as responsible for their own vic-
timization, suffering less, and to being able to control the
stalking without external interference (Wigman, 2009). As a
result, certain forms and certain victims of stalking may be
overlooked. 
7. Conclusion
The characterization of stalking as a form of violence against
women finds support in many empirical studies. Large-scale
community surveys report without exception an overrep-
resentation of female victims. In this respect, stalking differs
from domestic violence, where symmetrical prevalence
numbers are found on a regular basis. From this point of
view, a gender neutral approach to stalking would be inac-
curate. Stalking could furthermore have a more negative
impact on female than on male victims, albeit that the lit-
erature is more ambiguous on this point.  The characteri-
zation of stalking as a form of domestic violence finds
resonance in various empirical studies as well. Many victims
are stalked by their (violent) ex-partners and ex-intimate
stalking is generally more serious and long-lasting than
other types of stalking. 
As a result, stalking can generally be considered a form
of (domestic) violence against women. Devoting more fi-
nancial means, manpower and scientific research to these
forms of stalking rather than other ones therefore seems rea-
sonable and rational. Even guidelines for the police and the
public prosecution service which focus on stalking by ex-
partners or female victims may be justified as long as one
does not overlook cases that do not fit this stereotype. In
protocols, policy rules and courses for law enforcement per-
sonal and aid workers it may be emphasized that stalking
usually affects women and that ex-intimate stalkers gener-
ally exhibit more serious behavior, but at the same time it
needs to be stressed that these types of stalking are not the
only ones. 
For it remains important to realize that stalking is a het-
erogeneous phenomenon: large quantities of men are vic-
timized just as well and a significant part of the victim
population is made up by people who are stalked by others
than their ex-partners. Many of these victims have to cope
with serious forms of stalking and they are equally entitled
to help. Just because men are victimized less often or be-
cause non-intimate stalking victims are stalked for a shorter
period of time they should not be deprived of protection
beforehand. 
An analysis of the legislation in the thirteen European
Member States that criminalized stalking revealed that out-
wardly these legal anti-stalking provisionsm do not explic-
itly distinguish between male and female victims and
between intimate and non-intimate partner stalking. How-
14 Compare General Recommendation 19 of the CEDAW
Committee which also links violence against women to di-
scrimination. Meyersfeld (2010) argues that because of this
linkage, it becomes difficult for states that practice gender di-
scrimination or gender differentiation to ally themselves with
the Recommendation (p. 37).
15 This was the state of affairs on 6 September 2012. For an up-
date, see:  http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/con-
vention-violence/default_EN.asp?
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ever, by including a (limitative) list of stalking tactics that
may be gender-specific or by including a fear-requirement
it is possible that these provisions are inadvertently gender-
biased. When it comes to protection order legislation, the
focus on ex-partner stalking is more prominent. Some states
reserve criminal or civil protection orders exclusively for
(female) victims of domestic violence, not others.
This brings along a fundamental question: may the clas-
sification of stalking as a form of (domestic) violence against
women lead to a privileged position of female victims of
domestic violence in legislation, as is now the case in certain
European countries and – possibly – in the CoE Conven-
tion? In other words, is positive discrimination by law jus-
tified when it comes to victimization? 
In the past, certain crimes that affected women dispro-
portionately, such as domestic violence, were given low pri-
ority. For a long time domestic violence was seen as a
private matter in which the government had no right to
interfere. It is only fair that this prioritization was criticized
and adjusted, for often very serious incidents of violence
were ignored. However, it appears as though lately some
legislators have overcompensated their past indifference,
causing male victims or these typically ‘female’ crimes and
non-intimate stalking victims to be neglected. Professionals
may be alerted to the fact that stalking affects women dis-
proportionately or that ex-partner stalking usually is of a
more serious nature – information of this kind only facili-
tates the identification of the crime and it contributes to a
proper risk assessment – but it should not influence the
course of a criminal procedure or the access to protection
orders if the stalking is equally severe in nature, duration
and frequency.
For when it comes to victimization, the seriousness of
the crime should always be the decisive factor, not the gen-
der of the victim or the nature of the victim’s (prior) rela-
tionship to the offender. If certain victims are more
vulnerable – e.g., victims who are financially, socially or
emotionally dependent on their stalker – this can be ex-
pressed in policy guidelines for the police and the prosecu-
tion service, but there should always be an adequate reaction
to other forms of stalking as well. This is impossible when
simple measures such as protection orders are reserved for
a certain type of victim only. Protection orders should be
available to all victims and anti-stalking legislation should be
drafted in a manner that includes male and female, intimate
and non-intimate stalking. 
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APPENDIX
 
 
 
 
Country Term used to define stalking 
Year of 
coming 
into 
force 
Legal definition of stalking 
Austria1 ‘Beharrliche 
Verfolgung’ 
2006 §107a of the Criminal Code: ‘(1) He who unlawfully insistently 
persecutes a person shall be punished with imprisonment of up 
to one year. (2) A person insistently persecutes if he, in a 
suitable way, with the intention of seriously affecting his way of 
life, during a longer period of time 1. seeks his physical 
proximity 2. uses telecommunication or other means of 
communication or third parties to get into contact with him 3. by 
using his personal data orders goods or services for him 4. by 
using his personal data, prompting third parties to contact him.’ 
Belgium1 ‘Belaging’ 1998 Article 442bis of the Criminal Code: ‘He, who harassed a 
person, while he knew or should have known that due to his 
behaviour he would seriously disturb this person’s peace, will 
be punished with a term of imprisonment of fifteen days to two 
years and with a fine ranging from 50 euro to 300 euro or with 
one or those punishments. The behaviour described in this 
article can only be prosecuted following a complaint by the 
person claiming to be harassed.’ 
The Czech 
Republic1 
‘Nebezpe!né 
pronásledování’ 
2010 §354 of the Criminal Code: ‘He who pursues another for a long 
time by a) threatening him or a person close to him with harm 
to health or any other harm b) seeking his proximity or 
following him; c) persistently contacting him by electronic 
means, in a written form or otherwise; d) restricting him in his 
usual way of life; or by e) abusing his personal information in 
order to obtain personal or other contacts; and such conduct 
may invoke reasonable fear in the person pursued regarding 
his life or health, or the life or health of persons close to him.’ 
Denmark2 ‘Forfølgelse’ 1933 §265 of the Criminal Code: ‘Any person who violates the 
peace of some other person by intruding on him, pursuing him 
with letters or inconveniencing him in any other similar way, 
despite warnings by the police, shall be liable to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years. A warning 
under this provision shall be valid for 5 years.’  
Germany3 ‘Nachstellung’ 2007 §238 of the Criminal Code: ‘Whosoever unlawfully stalks 
another person by 
1) Seeking his proximity 
2) Trying to establish contact with him by means of 
telecommunications or other means of telecommunication 
or through third persons 
3) Abusing his personal data for the purpose of ordering 
goods or services for him or causing third persons to 
make contact with him 
4) Threatening him or a person close to him with loss of life 
or limb, damage to health, or deprivation of freedom, or 
5) Committing similar acts 
and thereby seriously infringes his lifestyle shall be liable 
to imprisonment of not more than three years or a fine. 
(2)The penalty shall be three months to five years if the 
offender places the victim, a relative of or another person close 
to the victim in danger of death or serious injury 
(3)  If the offender causes the death of the victim, a relative of 
or another person close to the victim the penalty shall be 
imprisonment from one to ten years. 
(4) Cases under subsection (1) above may only be prosecuted 
upon request unless the prosecuting authority considers 
propio motu that prosecution is required because of special 
public interest.’  
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Hungary1 ‘Zaklatás’ 2008 §176/A of the Criminal Code: ‘(1) Any person who with the 
intention to intimidate another person, or to disturb the privacy 
or the everyday life of another person, engages in the regular 
or persistent harassment of another person, by regularly 
seeking contact with a person against his/her will, either in 
person or by means of telecommunication, even if no serious 
crime has been committed, is guilty of an offence, punished by 
one year imprisonment, community work or a fine. (2) He who, 
for the purpose of intimidation, threatens to commit a 
punishable violent act against a person or a relative of this 
person, thereby putting that person in imminent fear of his/her 
life or health, or the life or health of a relative of this person is 
guilty of an offence, punished by two years imprisonment, 
community work or a fine. (3) He who harasses (a) a former 
spouse or registered partner, (b) a person under his care, 
custody, supervision or medical care, as mentioned in (1) shall 
be punished by two years’ imprisonment, community work or a 
fine, or, as guilty of the criminal offence mentioned in (2), with 
three years’ imprisonment.’ 
Ireland ‘Harassment’ 1997 Non-fatal Offences against the Person Act: Section 10: ‘Any 
person who, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, by 
any means including by use of the telephone, harasses 
another by persistently following, watching, pestering, 
besetting or communicating with him or her shall be guilty of 
an offence. For the purposes of this section a person harasses 
another where (a) he or she, by his or her acts intentionally or 
recklessly, seriously interferes with the other’s peace and 
privacy or causes alarm, distress or harm to the other and (b) 
his or her acts are such that a reasonable person would realize 
that the acts would seriously interfere with the other’s peace 
and privacy or cause alarm, distress or harm to the other. A 
person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable (a) 
on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £ 1,500 or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to both, 
or (b) on conviction on indictment to a fine or to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 7 years or to both.’  
Italy4 ‘Atti persecutori’ 2009 Article 612bis of the Criminal Code: ‘If it is not a more serious 
crime, he who repeatedly harasses or threats another person 
in order to cause a persistent anxiety or fear or a serious 
concern for his/her safety or for the safety of another person, 
linked to the victim by an affective bond, or to oblige such 
person to change his/her own life habits, is punished with 
imprisonment from six months to four years. The punishment 
is increased if the author of the crime is an ex-partner of the 
victim. The punishment is increased up to half if the victim is a 
minor, or a pregnant woman or a person with disabilities as 
article 3 law n. 104 of 1992, or if the fact is committed with 
weapons or by a distorted person. The crime is punishable on 
the complaint of the victim. The authority proceeds ex officio if 
the fact is committed against a minor or a person with 
disabilities (…) as well as when the fact is connected with 
another crime for which ex officio action is foreseen.’  
Luxemburg1 ‘Harcèlement 
obsessionel’ 
2009 Article 442-2 of the Criminal Code: ‘Anyone who repeatedly 
harassed a person while he knew or should have known that 
by such conduct he would seriously affect the tranquillity of 
that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of fifteen 
days to two years and a fine of 251 to 3000 euro, or one of 
these penalties. The offence in this article shall be prosecuted 
on the complaint of the victim, his legal representative or his 
assigns.  
Malta2 ‘Fastidju’ 2005 Article 251A of the Criminal Code: ‘A person who pursues a 
course of conduct which amounts to harassment of another 
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person, and which he knows or ought to know amounts to 
harassment of such other person, shall be guilty of an offence 
under this article. For the purpose of this article, the person 
whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it 
amounts to harassment of another person if a reasonable 
person in possession of the same information would think the 
course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other 
person. A person guilty of an offence under this article shall be 
liable to the punishment of imprisonment for a term of one to 
three months or to a fine of not less than two thousand and 
three hundred and twenty-nine euro and thirty-seven cents 
and not more than four thousand and six hundred and fifty-
eight euro and seventy-five cents, or to both such fine and 
imprisonment. Provided that the punishment shall be 
increased by one degree where the offence is committed 
against any person mentioned in article 222 (1).’  
 
Article 251B of the Criminal Code: ‘A person whose course of 
conduct causes another to fear that violence will be used 
against him or his property or against the person or property of 
any of his ascendants, descendents, brothers or sisters or any 
person mentioned in this article 221(1) shall be guilty of an 
offence if he knows or ought to know that this course of 
conduct will cause the other so to fear on each of those 
occasions, and shall be liable to the punishment of 
imprisonment for a term from three to six months or to a fine of 
not less than four thousand and six hundred and fifty-eight 
euro and seventy-five cents and not more than eleven 
thousand and six hundred and forty-six euro and eighty-seven 
cents, or to both such fine and imprisonment.’ Article 251C of 
the Criminal Code: ‘in articles 251A and 251B references to 
harassing a person include alarming the person or causing the 
person distress.’  
The 
Netherlands1 
‘Belaging’ 2000 Article 285b of the Criminal Code: ‘He who unlawfully, 
systematically, intentionally intrudes upon another person’s 
privacy with the aim of forcing that person to do something, to 
refrain from doing something, to tolerate something or to instil 
fear in that person, is liable, as guilty of stalking, to a prison 
term with a maximum of three years or a fine of the fourth 
category. Prosecution can only occur on the complaint of the 
person against whom the crime was committed. 
Poland ‘Stalking’ 2011 Article 190a of the Criminal Code: ‘(1) He who by the 
persistent harassment of another person or a person’s near 
ones raises in him a reasonable fear or significantly violates 
his privacy shall be liable to an imprisonment of up to 3 years. 
(2) He who, pretending to be another person, uses his image 
or other personal data in order to cause material or personal 
damage, shall be subjected to the same penalty. (3) If the act 
specified in § 1 or 2 results in a suicide attempt by the victim, 
the perpetrator is liable to an imprisonment of one to 10 years. 
(4) Prosecution of the crime specified in § 1 or 2 occurs at the 
request of the victim. 
The United 
Kingdom 
‘Harassment’ 
and ‘putting 
people in fear of 
violence’ 
1997 Protection from Harassment Act: Section 1: 'A person must not 
pursue a course of conduct (a) which amounts to harassment 
of another, and (b) which he knows or ought to know amounts 
to harassment of the other. For the purposes of this section, 
the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to 
know that it amounts to harassment of another if a reasonable 
person in possession of the same information would think the 
course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other.' 
Section 2: 'A person who pursues a course of conduct in 
breach of section 1 is guilty of an offence. A person guilty of an 
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offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine 
not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or both.' Section 
4: 'A person whose course of conduct causes another to fear, 
on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against 
him is guilty of an offence if he knows or ought to know that 
this course of conduct will cause the other so to fear on each 
of those occasions. For the purposes of this section, the 
person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know 
that it will cause another to fear that violence will be used 
against him on any occasion if a reasonable person in 
possession of the same information would think the course of 
conduct would cause the other so to fear on that occasion. A 
person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on 
conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding five years, or a fine, or both, or on summary 
conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six 
months, or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or 
both.' Section 7: ‘References to harassing a person include 
alarming the person of causing the person distress.’ 
1 This legal definition was translated by the author (with the help of a native speaker). 
2 This translation was copied from De Fazio (2009). 
3 This official translation can be found at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#StGBengl_000P238. 
4 This translation combines the one from De Fazio (2009) with the one from the Feasibility study (2010). 
 
 
